Into the Storm

World War II is a major event in the history of the past one hundred years.  It would engulf the world from the islands of the South Pacific to the fjords of Norway.  It called a generation, and more than any other event has shaped the geo-political world in which we live today.  Many will recall Pearl Harbor, D-Day, Battle of the Bulge, and of course the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan.  There were, however, other key events.  One under-realized event is the Allied invasion of Italy.  Italy was, for much of the conflict, associated with the Axis powers through the dictatorship of Benito Mussolini.  The Allied invasion of Italy, beginning in Sicily in July 1943 would be the downfall of Il Duce.  He would be arrested by his own people, imprisoned, rescued by orders of Hitler, and upon the collapse of German troops in northern Italy once again captured and put to death.

Invasion of Italy

Death would come to central Italy.  One of the most difficult circumstances to face the Allies in the invasion of Italy was the river valleys of the Rapido, Liri, and where at their confluence they formed the Garigliano River. Nearby was Highway 6 and upstream of the confluence was the small Italian town of Cassino.  Prior to war, it would have been a picture card of an Italian village; shops and homes built of locally quarried stone sat in a valley and along the lower hillsides. Frank and Marie Barone’s relatives could easily have worked in the town.  The town would become of strategic importance in the Allied move toward Rome.  But, the move was associated with miscalculation, poor assignments and even worse.

British Major General Harold Alexander

 September 1943 saw the Allies advance into the leg of Italy with two major movements from the south, one to the east of the mountain range that forms the bone of the leg, the other on the west side.  The movements were overseen by General Harold Alexander, Lord of Tunis.  Under him, leading the approach from the west side of the bone, was an American, Major General Mark Clark.  Winter in the mountains put the effort to get to Rome solely on the western movement as the forces to the east could not make it through the snow covered passes.  Mark Clark would be thrust into the limelight, and his record as a general would forever be debated.  Two primary routes up the west side of Italy would allow access to Rome.  The primary route, the former Appian Way was inaccessible due to flooding of the roadway in lowland areas.  This was a great defensive move by the Germans, it then required the Allied forces to move up Hwy 6 toward Cassino, and then onto Rome.  But it required crossings of fast flowing mountain snow fed rivers in the valleys among the mountains.  The surrounding hills provided the Germans vantage points for observation and defensive actions; the Germans would form what is known as the Gustav line. 

US General Mark Clark

It took until mid-January 1944 for the Allies to get near this crucial area.  They had sustained 16,000 casualties to advance the last seven miles to reach near the Gustav line.  The soldiers had little time to rest, and the command little time to plan.  Two days after their January 15 arrival, the allies made their first attempt was to cross the Garigliano River.  It was here that the US Commander failed to realize that the German forces in this area were rather thin.  The German commander was asking for reinforcements.  Reinforcements would be pulled from Rome, and by the time of the main attack by US troops on January 20, the German reinforcements had arrived.  Historians continue to debate whether the effect of this lack of decision was a missed opportunity to gain a foothold in the valley to move up the road to Rome.  Whatever it was, part of Clark’s plan worked, as the Germans pulled troops from the defense of Rome.  The central attack would fail and regiments involved in this attack would, for all intents and purposes lose so many men as to fail to exist.  One division lost 2,100 men (killed, missing or wounded) within a 48 hour period.  Lack of preparation did not help as booby traps and mines were not cleared before the advance. 

Allied advance on the Rapido River, just south of Cassino

On January 24, the Allies decided to attempt to move north of Cassio, with the intent of then moving left and coming up behind the German defenses that formed the Gustav line.  Crossing of the fast-moving rivers was difficult and the high water left little room for armor units, thus requiring an exceedingly long time for traction mats to be used on the steep river banks.  Despite the problems, some US troops were able to move south toward Monastery Hill, and by early February were occupying a small hamlet only one mile from the monastery that sat atop an adjoining hill.  By February 7, a battalion was only four hundred yards from the abbey.  Monks would watch Allied and German patrols exchange fire below the abbey walls.  In fact, Rick Atkinson in his book, The Day of Battle notes that a German Corps commander felt that the Allies were within 100 meters of success.  Alexander and Clark had attacked on too broad a front, and failed to prick through cracks in the German defense.  The Allies wanted to take what was a defenseless abbey, but the German defenses well below the walls proved too difficult to break.  Weary US troops would give way to men from New Zealand and India under the command of Lt. General Bernard Fryberg.  Freyberg would essentially desire to continue the plan already in play which was failing miserably.  He would continue the original advance from the south east across the rivers, and at the same time continue the movement to go behind the German lines.

Cassino town after Allied advance

The US was also making another movement toward Rome from Anzio, and US Troops in that location found themselves in a predicament much like they found themselves at Cassino.  Major General Clark, was also in charge of the Anzio attack.  A commander more astute than Clark may have realized the opportunities that were presented early in the battle before German reinforcements arrived at the Gustav line.  A commanding General with a greater sense of purpose than Alexander, may have realized a need to divide command for the two major attacks.  Some historians believe the fault lies with Alexander for having given Clark the duty of arranging advances from both Cassino and Anzio, rather than dividing command.  In contrast, German Field Marshall Kesselring had divided defense of the two areas under separate commands. 

New Zealand Lt. General Bernard Fryberg

War is fraught with failures, and the battle in Italy is no different.  The losses would increase.  Allied troops would find themselves marching into a storm of a strong German defensive line.  The Allied reinforcements commanded by Fryberg would set in motion a series of events that would place taradiddle over truth, and ruination over ingenuity.  Fryberg was a dentist by training, and while he had the ear of General Alexander, an acquaintance, as reported by Atkinson, would say of Fryberg:  “His great fearlessness owed something to a lack of imagination.”  Fearlessness may have allowed his promotion, but his lack of imagination would come into play and enter into one of the most debated decisions of the war.  To find out about that decision, you will need to read the post due on or about February 15 titled:  “That Tomb of Miscalculation”