Buffer Zone

When Russia invaded Ukraine last year it should not have come as a surprise to the elites and power brokers of the world. After all,  several years earlier Russia "annexed" part Crimea from Ukraine. Russia has been wanting a buffer zone from the west since shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further, the Russian desire for a buffer zone is not new, and relates, in part, to its geographic makeup. 

Ukraine and Russia have a long history. Kyivan Rus was a country back in 1054 which was larger than the Ukraine we know today. In the 13th century this country was run over by the Mongols. In the 14th century Lithuania threw out the Mongols and unified this area with Poland. The first use of the Ukrainian flag came following WWI in 1918. Shortly after, due to Germany's defeat in WWI, Ukraine was absorbed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was not an easy takeover. Josef Stalin's farm collectivization caused the deaths of 4 million Ukrainians. In December 1991 over 90% of Ukrainians vote for independence from the USSR. Yet there were wide variations in the voting with high numbers in Western Ukraine, and much lower numbers in the districts near Russia. 

Major Russian Rivers

Russia is markedly different than the United States, and we Americans have a tendency to view the world and all that it is from the American perspective. However, thinking that all nations are meant to recognize our values and our systems has not shown to always be transferrable. We view our American values, particularly those in the Washington think tanks, as universal. As Robert Kaplan writes, the Romans thought their values universal. They were not. Kaplan also comments that imperialism can be a relatively weak form of sovereignty exercised by a great power. Along with imperialism is also conquest. George Keenan, an American diplomat, who was born and raised in Milwaukee, viewed conquest as a source of weakness. Once you engage another country the invading country has the obligation and responsibility for governance. Two situations prove this point. 

First, when the US invaded Iraq, Pope John Paul II mightily proclaimed against the war saying, much as Pope Francis does today about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that it is a defeat for humanity. The Pope also said, not unlike a mother telling a child in a dime store, you break it you own it. The Vatican understood the situation on the ground in the Mid-east better than did the west. Here was a case where the US intervention was brought about by a certain hubris of American values. It did not end well.  

Kyivan Rus, 1054
National Geographic

Second, part of the reason for the decline and fall of the Soviet Union was because Russia had to support a number of satellite states. One would think Russia would learn from the Soviet experience, but perhaps they have a certain amount of hubris too (after all they suspected their invasion of Ukraine would be quick). This is where geography comes into play. 

The geography of Russia is markedly different than that of the temperate United States. Russia's inland streams and rivers tend to run north and south, unable to have unified the wide east-west nature of the country. By comparison, the US not only has almost more navigable inland waters than the rest of the world combined, but our geography is different. The great Mississippi runs north and south, but it is fed by great rivers than run at an angle--the Missouri, Snake, Wisconsin, Ohio, Platte, Arkansas, Colorado, Tennessee to name the major ones. These rivers helped to unify the nation when water transport was the most efficient method--it unified a nation and created a culture. 

Geographically, Russia has lacked the unifying nature of rivers present in the United States. This is important, because they have long viewed the need for a buffer from Europe. The Center for Strategic and International Studies in a June 28, 2017 document noted that Russia views sectarian strife, and fragmentation as destabilizing, much like the West does, but they use a different approach or method to address this challenge. Their  approach, creation of buffer zones, was seen in Crimea and they have now applied it to Ukraine. This article notes: 

Russia perceives its own actions as defensive and mirrors Western accusations by claiming foreign military buildup and intelligence services in its near abroad seek to destroy its unity and territorial integrity. No clear distinction is drawn by either document between Russia’s internal and external borders. On the contrary, neighbor countries allegedly serve as an entry point to shape Russia’s information space and its internal sphere, undermining its national interests. In this perspective, radical political change at Russia’s outskirts must be thwarted at any cost and could possibly lead to conflict.

The article goes on to specifically comment on buffers: 

The perceived need to recreate a buffer zone at Russia’s borders against the West has pervaded Russia’s leadership since the early 1990s. It started with the trauma of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the voluntary demise of which Vladimir Putin later called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” At the turn of the 2000s, Russia, fearing unrest in the North Caucasus (Chechnya and later Dagestan, Ingushetia, or Kabardino-Balkaria) could lead to attempts at secession in its inner abroad, responded heavy handedly.

Russia was concerned about its former satellite countries to its south, as it is concerned about its former satellites to the west. Clearly, Putin is desirous of remaking Russia as the old USSR. That Russia is desirous of a buffer goes back over 100 years to Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski (diacritical marks missing), who coined the term Intermarium, which Kaplan notes is Latin for between the seas, in this case the Baltic in the north and the Black to the southeast, and eastward to the Caucasus mountains, to the Caspian Sea. Pilsudski, says Kaplan, concluded that this will be the new battleground. Kaplan claims that Russia is still very big, but "it is an insecure land power that has suffered invasions not only from Hitler and Napoleon, but from Swedes, Lithuanians, and Poles and consequently requires a buffer zone of soft influence in Central and Eastern Europe." Not only did former parts of the Soviet Union provide this buffer, but so did their satellite countries--Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, down to Yugoslavia. The Iron Curtain was largely a result of FDR"s capitulation to Stalin at the Yalta conference, setting forth ramifications we continue to face today:. Russia wants their buffer back. Russia views the eastern regions of Ukraine as dominated by ethnic Russians. This was heard before, when the west appeased Hitler with the Sudetenland, the ethnic German part of then Czechoslovakia. Appeasement is easy to see after the fact. The problem with what the Brits did with Hitler in giving away part of Czechoslovakia, is they never asked the Czechs. Hitler was not pleased with just the Sudetenland and later invaded and took all of Czechoslovakia. As we know, Hitler and his desire for lebensraum grew to all of Europe and beyond.

Great powers have a tendency to do what they wish. When faced with the Iranian hostage crises, and the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter outlined, in his Jan 23, 1980 State of the Union speech what became known as the Carter Doctrine, in which he said:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d45 )

This doctrine has been used to advance military intervention by the US since 1980. Russia has a long memory, and probably wonders why a US sphere of influence can extend to the Middle East, but Russia's cannot extend west to adjacent countries? Oil is a powerful resource, and played an important role in US foreign policy. Ukraine also contains certain valuable resources--fertile plains, and important waterways. Water is quickly becoming the new oil. From oil to food, resource availability also show how geography shapes not only the world but how and why geo-political conflicts arise.

Ukraine 1918 with current border outlined
National Geographic

This is not to say that Russia has a right to the buffer, much less a right to invade Ukraine, but this does help explain their point of view. It seems to me, that one has to know the interests and designs of another, so as to understand and anticipate, and decide what level of attention may be best. I guess it is like interest-based bargaining. Will a cease fire or negotiated settlement result? My American mind says that Russia is too far into the conflict for any settlement. Pope Francis, may well be right that we are on the cusp of of WWIII by the insidious nature of of small conflicts around the globe that ferment and become greater and greater. The conflict in Ukraine is just one aspect of current global discord. The funny thing is as the world becomes more globalized more diverse conflicts seem to develop. I believe part of this lies in a people's need to be tied to a certain geography and culture. 

The US keeps funding the war effort at great levels. Of funding provided to Ukraine from Jan 24, 2022 to May 31, 2023 61% or $46.6 billion was for military assistance, $3.9 billion, 5%, for humanitarian assistance, and $26.4 billion, 34%, financial assistance. The great majority of aid to Ukraine for its war effort comes from the US. The US will now provide F-16 fighter jets, and train Ukraine fighter pilots for their use in the conflict. In his farewell address, President Eisenhower made this prescient comment: "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." 

The war in Ukraine shows three key points. First, that the US is still required to provide the might in European conflicts. Second, that Russia is acting on its desire for a buffer. This region, as an area of conflict was noted over 100 years ago, determined in large part by geography. It seems that the west was not prepared for this invasion. Third, as JPII and Francis have commented, war is always a failure, regardless of what side wins. Geo-political conflicts are always difficult, but the underlying geography provides a partial explanation.

Sources:

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-design-black-sea-extending-buffer-zone

2017. Kaplan, Robert D. Earning the Rockies: How Geography Shapes America's Role in the World, Random House, NY NY.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d45

"Ukraine, A Year at War", National Geographic, map insert, June 2023. 

https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts?gclid=CjwKCAjwoqGnBhAcEiwAwK-OkWakGIBx2V0rcbWzhEsperf7Jo-_aETNzDwKq-YBz2xjrORf6GRzVRoCIWwQAvD_BwE

https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address